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Abstract 
This paper concentrates on the relations between the EU and Russia. A closer look at 
these relations shows that one dialogue within them – the energy dialogue – is 
developing more intensively than the others. This creates an asymmetry in the relations 
between the two actors. Thus the paper sets out to find the answer to the question, “Why 
are the EU – Russian relations imbalanced?” The analysis is made within three streams: 
interdependence, the study of polities and the study of images. Interdependence between 
the EU and Russia is analysed within the framework of the theory of power and 
interdependence by Joseph Nye Jr. and Robert Keohane; polities are contrasted using the 
notions of the governance approach and images are examined through applying the study 
of images of Robert Jervis in the case of the EU–Russia relations. The paper comes to the 
conclusion, that the contradictions and ambiguities of polities and images are so big and 
strong, that the only link that keeps the two actors together is the interdependence link. 
These are effects of contiguity. 
 
 
Keywords: EU–Russia relations, asymmetry of relations, interdependence, energy 
dialogue, polity, image 
 
Characters: 87 312 
 2
Abbreviations 
CSP Country Strategy Paper 
ECT Energy Charter Treaty 
ENP European Neighbourhood Policy 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IEA International Energy Agency 
INTAS The International Association for the Promotion of Co-operation with 
Scientists from the New Independent States (NIS) of the Former 
Soviet Union 
PCA Partnership and Co-operation Agreement 
RF Russian Federation 
TACIS Technical Assistance/Aid to the Community of Independent States 
TEMPUS Trans – European mobility scheme for university studies 
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
 3
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 7 
1 The Aim of the Research and its Importance ....................................................... 8 
2 The Organisation of the research.......................................................................... 8 
The Outline and Theoretical Background ......................................................... 8 
Methodology.................................................................................................... 10 
Delimitations ................................................................................................... 10 
 
1 The Asymmetry of Relations and Interdependence of Russia and the EU ............ 11 
1.1 Spheres of Co-operation and the Asymmetry between Them............................ 11 
1.1.1 The Socio-Cultural Dialogue.................................................................. 11 
1.1.2 The Political Dialogue............................................................................ 12 
1.1.3 The Economic Dialogue ......................................................................... 13 
1.1.4 The Asymmetry ...................................................................................... 14 
1.2 The Interdependence of Russia and the EU ....................................................... 14 
1.2.1 The Dependence of Russia on the EU.................................................... 14 
1.2.2 The Dependence of the EU on Russia.................................................... 16 
1.2.3 Concepts of Sensitivity and Vulnerability.............................................. 18 
 
2 The Study of Polities.................................................................................................... 20 
2.1 Governance of the Polities.................................................................................. 20 
2.1.1 Governance of the EU ............................................................................ 20 
2.1.2 Governance of Russia............................................................................. 22 
2.1.3 Contrasts and clashes of the Governance of the EU and Russia ............ 24 
2.2 Actorness of the Polities ..................................................................................... 25 
2.2.1 The EU as an Actor ................................................................................ 25 
2.2.2 Russia as an Actor .................................................................................. 26 
2.2.3 The Divergence of Actorness ................................................................. 26 
2.3 The Role of Culture ............................................................................................ 26 
 4
 3 The Study of Images.................................................................................................... 29 
3.1 Identity, Image, and Constructing the ‘Other’.................................................... 29 
3.2 Europe and Russia: Constructing the ‘Other’..................................................... 29 
3.3 The Image of Russia........................................................................................... 31 
3.3.1 The Image Constructed in Reality among Ordinary People................... 31 
3.3.2 The Desired Image and Reality .............................................................. 32 
3.4 The Image of the EU .......................................................................................... 34 
3.4.1 The Image Constructed in Reality among Ordinary People................... 34 
3.4.2 The Desired Image and Reality .............................................................. 35 
 
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 37 
 
Appendix I ........................................................................................................................ 39 
Appendix II....................................................................................................................... 41 
Appendix III ..................................................................................................................... 43 
Appendix IV ..................................................................................................................... 45 
Appendix V ...................................................................................................................... 47 
 
Bibliography.................................................................................................................... 49 
 
 
 
List of figures and tables: 
 
Figure 1. Importance of the European market for Russian econmy. ............................... 15 
Figure 2. The origins of imports into the EU-27 ............................................................. 16 
Figure 3. Major European Recipients of Russian Natural Gas Exports, 2005 ................ 17 
 
Table 1. Governance of the EU and Russia ..................................................................... 24 
 5
  
 
 
 
 
“[The] EU and Russia are still in a state of profound mutual ambiguity. They know that 
they have to try to make the best of living together in the same European home, but do 
not yet know how to do it. The partners seem to parody the old Soviet joke from the 
workplace in the factory: ‘We pretend to work and they pretend to pay us’. The Euro-
Russki variant seems to go like this: ‘We pretend to be converging on common European 
values and they pretend to be helping us do so’”. 
Emerson, Michael, 2005: 1 
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Introduction 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and collapse of the Soviet Union, the relations of Russia 
with the outside world had to change and had to be built from the very foundation 
(though history mattered as well). Nowadays the changes which are taking place in 
Russia in the last several years have attracted enormous attention from scholars, officials, 
journalists and ordinary citizens. The attitude of the Russian President towards 
democratisation and democratic values arises more and more concern in the West: 
In the past, in the era of colonialism, colonialist countries talked about their so-called 
civilizing role. Today, [some countries] use slogans of spreading democracy for the same 
purpose, and that is to gain unilateral advantages and ensure their own interests. 
(Vladimir Putin, cited in Bigg, 2007) 
Russia as an actor criticises US politics, puts pressure on the EU concerning new 
agreements, threatens to break relations with an EU country (example of Estonia’s 
removal of the Bronze soldier statue and the grave of Soviet soldiers on 26th–27th April 
20071), manipulates oil and natural gas dependants (Ukraine–Russia gas dispute of 
2005–20062, and the Russia–Belarus energy dispute3, which influenced the gas and oil 
supply of the EU greatly), and gets away with it, without being strongly criticised or 
judged neither by the US, nor by the EU. Thus, a lot of analysts notice that the 
cooperation between the EU and Russia has developed and is developing with certain 
asymmetries and peculiarities. Some authors call it simply the “special relationship”, 
(Roberts, 2007: 6-7); others state that the relations between the EU and Russia lack 
‘intimacy’ as a result of “the incongruity and a-synchronicity of development of both 
[European and Russian] civilizations” (Medvedev, 2000: 98). In general, the prevailing 
opinion is that the relationship between the two sides cannot be called healthy, even and 
equal, and continues to develop this way. 
The dialogue between Europe and Russia started in the beginning of 1990’s 
resulting in the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) in 1994. It 
came into force in 1997 and was valid for 10 years. If the new agreement is not signed in 
2007, the PCA is simply prolonged automatically. Officially the main strategy for 
partnership between the EU and Russia is determined at the Summits of Heads of 
State/Heads of Governments, which take place twice a year. Even the most important for 
the development of the EU – Russian cooperation Summits do not touch the sensitive 
subject of human rights and democratic freedoms and values. The Paris Summit in 
October 2000 established the all-important energy dialogue. At the 2003 Saint Petersburg 
                                                 
1 See, for example, 2nd Roundup: Estonian move on Soviet memorial sparks Russian wrath. April 26, 2007. 
Eux.TV – The Europe channel. 
2 See, for example, Nichol–Woehrel–Gelb, 2006; Stern, 2006; Roberts, 2006; Gazprom to raise gas prices 
for neighboring countries, Regnum News. 
3 See, for example, Russia-Belarus oil row hits supplies to EU countries, January 9, 2007; Konończuk, 
2007. 
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Summit the partnership between the EU and Russia was decided to be developed within 
4 ‘common spaces’: a common economic space; a common space of freedom, security 
and justice; a common space of external security and a common space of research and 
education (Europa Web “The EU’s Relations With Russia”; Country Strategy Paper 
(CSP) 2007-2013 Russian Federation; De Wilde– Pellon, 2006: 121)4. The Moscow 
Summit in May 2005 resulted in the creation of the Road Maps for implementation of the 
‘common spaces’ in the short and medium run. 
The three dialogues (socio-cultural, political and economic) will be under 
attention in this paper. Even a brief look at the development of these dialogues gives a 
picture of a more intense interaction in the economic sphere (rather the energy dialogue 
within it), whereas the other two are left far behind. It makes the relations between the 
countries imbalanced. In this paper this imbalance will be referred to as the ‘asymmetry 
in the relations’ between the EU and Russia. 
1 The Aim of the Research and its Importance 
This paper will study the asymmetry of the relations between the EU and Russia, trying 
to find the reasons which underlie its existence. Thus the main question of the paper is 
“Why are the EU – Russian relations imbalanced?” 
From security reasoning, it is essential to deeply understand the essence of the EU 
– Russian relations. The answer to the question “Why does the asymmetry exist?” might 
help both the EU and Russia to better understand each other and their relations. 
Continuation of the study might as well encourage and shape the further development of 
this extremely important relationship to a new level of more even cooperation in all 
spheres, thus making the relations healthier. All the recent events make the research up-
to-date, relevant and of current importance for international relations. 
2 The Organisation of the research 
The Outline and Theoretical Background 
The analyses of the asymmetry of relations between the EU and Russia will be held 
within three parts: Chapter 1 — “The Asymmetry of Relations and Interdependence of 
Russia and the EU”, Chapter 2 — “The Study of Polities”, and Chapter 3 — “The Study 
of Images”. 
Chapter 1 will look at the asymmetry of relations between the EU and Russia 
more closely, and then proceed to the interdependence of Russia and the EU which is 
determined in the most developed dialogue – economic and energy dialogue – which 
creates the asymmetry. The study of the interdependence will be analysed within the 
framework of the theory of power and interdependence by Joseph Nye Jr. and Robert 
Keohane (Keohane–Nye, 1987; Keohane–Nye, 1998; Keohane–Nye, 2000; Keohane–
Nye, 2001; Michalak, 1979; Rogerson, 2000). 
                                                 
4 In this paper they will be divided into three dialogues: socio-cultural, political and economic. 
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According to Joseph Nye Jr. and Robert Keohane, “dependence means a state of 
being determined or significantly affected by external forces. Interdependence, most 
simply defined, means mutual dependence”(Keohane – Nye, 2001: 7). Complex 
interdependence emerges when military power becomes less effective and less needed; 
when interstate relations are accompanied by transgovernmental and transnational links; 
and when the issues of the relations “are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy” 
(Keohane – Nye, 2001: 21). Thus, the complex interdependence is present in the context 
of the complex reality of the information age and globalisation. The discussion on the 
characteristics of EU–Russia interdependence will be held in Chapter 1. The concepts of 
sensitivity – amenability of costs to the effects from the outside before policies are 
changed to influence the situation (Keohane – Nye, 2001: 10-17) – and vulnerability – 
“actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed by external events even after policies have been 
changed” (Keohane – Nye, 2001: 11) – will be added to the analyses of the EU – Russia 
case. 
It will be argued that there are other factors that influence asymmetrical relations, 
besides the interdependence between the EU and Russia. Thus, Chapter 2 will proceed to 
the comparison of the EU and Russia as polities. The systemic and cultural differences 
between the two entities will be proved to be crucial for the underdevelopment of the 
socio-cultural and political dialogues. The governance approach will be used for handling 
the analyses, one of the main ideas of which is that “polity determines politics and 
policy” (Jachtenfuchs – Kohler-Koch, 2004: 101). 
The ambiguity found between the EU and Russia while analysing the polities will 
be challenged by the study of images. Thus, Chapter 3 will move on to analysing the 
images of both the EU and Russia which will be made through applying the study of 
images of Robert Jervis (Jervis, 1976; Jervis, 1989; Jervis, 1999; Jervis, 2002;) and the 
studies of constructing the ‘other’ by Iver Neumann (Neumann, 1996; Neumann, 1997; 
Neumann, 1999) and Bo Petersson (Petersson, 2001; Petersson, 2006) to the case of the 
EU – Russia relations. It will be proven that the neglect of the importance of images 
might change the understanding of the relations and lead to wrong conclusions and 
actions by the actors. The differences between the “desired images” and “constructed in 
reality images” will be shown and how this divergence influences the relations between 
the EU and Russia will be analysed. 
The idea of the importance of images for understanding and building the relations 
between states originates from the notion that any individual’s doings “cannot be 
explained without some reference to or assumptions about their views about the nature of 
the world” (Jervis, 1989: 4)5. Thus, the perception and an image of the other actor 
influences the types of policies and strategies that are being taken: “[T]he image of a 
state can be a major factor in determining whether and how easily the state can reach its 
goals” (Jervis, 1989: 6). Robert Jervis introduces the notions of signals and images as the 
main elements of image-building, where 
signals are statements or actions the meanings of which are established by tacit or explicit 
understandings among actors. … signals are issued mainly to influence the receiver’s image 
of the sender. … They do not contain inherent credibility. (Jervis, 1989: 18, 20-21) 
                                                 
5 For example, Harold and Margaret Sprout argue that the decisions must be understood in terms of the 
decision-makers’ “psychological environment” – their beliefs about the world and other actors (Sprout– 
Sprout, 1957: 311), their “estimate of the situation” (Sprout– Sprout, 1957: 319). 
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and  indices are statements or actions that carry some inherent evidence that the image projected 
is correct because they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor’s capabilities or 
intentions.  
(Jervis, 1989: 18, 26) 
After thorough analyses of the asymmetry of relations between the EU and 
Russia, the paper will come to the conclusion that the images and polities of the EU and 
Russia are very different and ambiguous, which makes it more and more hard for the two 
actors to communicate, thus the only link that prevents them from breaking apart is the 
interdependence. 
Methodology 
Different methods of research will be undertaken for different parts of the paper, as all 
parts can not be studied the same way. Thus, for analysing the interdependence and 
sensitivity/vulnerability of the actors, a qualitative evaluation of statistical data of 
imports – exports and budget estimates of the two sides of the relationship will be used. 
The study of polities is complicated by the problem of lack of transparency on the higher 
levels of political circles. Thus, the second part will include the analysis of secondary 
sources.  
In order to analyse the signals the two actors can make, speeches and documents 
will be analysed: the qualitative analysis of a number of speeches (see Appendix V) will 
be made. For understanding the construction of images of one side in the eyes of normal 
citizens of the other,opinion polls will be used as a base. Due to certain research 
problems (such as the impossibility to find any opinion polls among EU citizens on their 
opinions and attitudes towards Russia), the surveys were conducted by the author (in 
collaboration with a colleague from Moscow State University) among the EU citizens, as 
well as among the Russian citizens. The data will not be treated 
statistically/quantitatively, as the data collected can not be considered representative and 
random, thus the research results will be used for qualitative analysis and rather 
illustrative purposes (for more technical details about the surveys see Appendix I – IV). 
Delimitations 
As the topic of the paper is rather vast and difficult to investigate, there are several 
delimitations that should be made. First, the EU will be referred to as the Union in a 
whole, as the analyses of the bilateral relations of Russia with separate EU countries 
would complicate the research and be unnecessary for the main purpose of the paper: 
finding the reasons of the asymmetries of the EU–Russia relations, as the bilateral 
relations might be more or less asymmetrical. Second, studying the images of the EU and 
Russia, the image of the EU is treated as an image of one polity, not of different 
countries. Moreover, as the image of Russia might be very different within different 
countries of the EU, it will only complicate the research of studying them separately, thus 
the compound, general, aggregated image is taken. Third, studying the images is strongly 
intertwined with studying of identities and self-identities, but for the reasons of shortness 
of this paper (rather not shortness but the impossibility to write about everything) and not 
much relevance for the research, the author chose not to complicate the research with 
study of identities as well. 
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1 The Asymmetry of Relations and 
Interdependence of Russia and the EU 
Chapter 1 combines the Four Common Spaces (Country Strategy Paper RF (CSP) 2007-
2013: 3) into three dialogues and analyses them one by one in order to illustrate the 
asymmetry in detail: what is it and how is it happening. Next, one of them – the 
economic and energy dialogue – is examined more closely in terms of interdependence. 
1.1 Spheres of Co-operation and the Asymmetry 
between Them. 
There are three spheres of co-operation which can be identified: socio-cultural which 
consists of all developments within the Common Space of Research and Education; 
political which could be described by all the actions within the Common Space of 
Freedom, Security and Justice and the Common Space of External Security; and the 
economic dialogue, which includes all actions towards the common economic space and 
within which the energy dialogue is outstanding. 
1.1.1 The Socio-Cultural Dialogue 
The socio-cultural dialogue is shaped around several spheres: cooperation in research and 
technology, cooperation in education and popularization of culture. Russian scientists 
have world fame for being good researchers and possessing ‘know-how’6. But nowadays 
Russia lacks the capacity for developing technology and deep research. Thus the 
cooperation with the European states in the area of research capacity could be a great 
opportunity for Russian, as well as European science in some areas. 
Despite all measures and funding, the frameworks for research and development, 
such as TEMPUS, Erasmus Mundus and the Youth Programme remain unknown. Within 
the Sixth Framework Programme for Research and Development including INTAS7 the 
“Russian organizations are participating in 80 research projects together with Western 
European partners” (Delegation of European Commission to Russia Official Web-site. 
Areas of co-operation. Science and Technology. 
                                                 
6 Especially in “theoretical physics, plasma physics, mathematics, nanotechnologies and nanosciences, 
aerospace, nuclear science and some areas of biology” (Delegation of European Commission to Russia 
Official Web-site. Areas of co-operation. Science and Technology. 
http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_227.htm) 
7 INTAS – “The International Association for the Promotion of Co-operation with Scientists from the New 
Independent States (NIS) of the Former Soviet Union. Association formed by the European Community, 
European Union Member States and like-minded countries to promote East-West scientific co-operation 
between INTAS members and INTAS-NIS partner countries” (INTAS official web site. 
http://www.intas.be/). 
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http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_227.htm), which is not a big number for the 
quantity of Russian scientists and research organizations. 
Within the TEMPUS programme which manages co-operation between the 
European and Russian Universities in personnel training and exchange, there are only 17 
Joint European Projects, only one of which is active nowadays (Delegation of European 
Commission to Russia Official Web-site. Areas of co-operation. Higher education. 
http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/ru/p_500.htm). The Erasmus Mundus Programme is not 
known, and of course is not as widespread as the Erasmus Programme is in Europe. 
There are certain institutional problems: though Russia has joined the Bologna Process 
and confirmed her aspirations to reform the education system, there are still a plenty of 
inconsistencies between the Russian and all European countries’ educational standards. 
The last aspect of the socio-cultural dialogue is co-operation in cultural matters, 
which consist mainly of “Film festivals” (which do not have wide publicity), “Culture 
weeks” in different cities of Russia and Europe, some concerts and exhibitions. Besides, 
it is stated that one of the objective of the cultural co-operation is 
[t]o strengthen and enhance the European identity on the basis of common values, including 
freedom of expression, democratic functioning of the media, respect for human rights 
including the rights of persons belonging to minorities, and promotion of cultural and 
linguistic diversity as a basis for vitality of civil society in Europe without dividing lines. 
Europa Web. The EU’s relations with Russia. 
The so-called “common values” are not so common for Russia, what is proven by 
the ‘not-so-free’ media, minority rights violation in Chechnya and, for example, violent 
suppressions of meetings and protests in Moscow and Saint Petersburg in April 2007, 
when “hundreds were arrested and dozens hospitalized” (Democracy à la russe, 2007. 
The Economist). But despite all this, the “common values” or their promotion in Russia 
is not included in most of the agreements on co-operation between the EU and Russia. As 
well as the new Road Map for the Four Common Spaces does not mention any cultural or 
democratic values, nor their promotion, nor the respect for human rights, nor the more 
democratic press and media (CSP RF 2007-2013: 45-47). Thus, the declared objectives 
of the cultural co-operation do not match the reality: in practice the EU remains silent 
about the “common values”. This silence is fundamentally intertwined with the political 
dialogue. 
1.1.2 The Political Dialogue 
The “common values” discussed above could be also seen as a part of the political 
dialogue, or the absence of the discussion about them as a part of the absence of the 
political dialogue. This dialogue is mainly shaped around the process of ‘visa 
facilitation’, started during the Sochi Summit in May 2006 with the signing of the 
agreement on May 25, 2006 (Europa Web. The EU’s relations with Russia) which would 
provide “minor changes to the rules for issuing visas, simplifying procedures for certain 
categories of citizens on both sides” (Roberts, 2007: 41). The discussions about the fight 
with terrorism and concerning weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are also of high 
interest, as well as the rather shallow co-operation on ‘border issues’, human trafficking, 
fight against drugs and money laundering (Europa Web. The EU’s relations with Russia). 
But when it comes to conflict resolution, to the discussion of the so-called ‘frozen 
conflicts’ of Transdnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh and of the 
Chechen republic, the floor becomes slippery. With these subjects the dialogue becomes 
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too sensitive to talk about it out loud and face to face. Moreover, the problem of 
“common values” comes into the light again: “Europeans have not been reticent to raise 
questions about Russia’s commitment and ability to uphold core universal and European 
values and pursue democratic reforms” [emphasis added](Roberts, 2007: 38). But these 
questions have not been asked. 
Co-operation within the sphere of justice and the rule of law could be 
characterized by the superficial agreements without a clear aim or plan of realization of 
the goals set. The high level of corruption and the lack of vertical and horizontal 
accountability and transparency give little chance for judicial reform, which is supposed 
to “ensure the independence and the effectiveness of the judiciary in the EU Member 
States and Russia based on the rule of law” (CSP RF 2007-2013: 44). But judicial reform 
still remains mainly on paper and in words, rather than in deeds. 
1.1.3 The Economic Dialogue 
This is the only dialogue out of the three outlined is discussed and becomes more 
institutionalised, though with rather vague steps as well: the economic dialogue. Despite 
the fact that “the road map is less precise than the PCA about progress toward a free trade 
area” (Roberts, 2007: 42), there are some important bilateral agreements on steels and 
textiles8, the negotiations for the Agreement on Fisheries are ongoing, the negotiations 
on Russia’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has already finished; and 
nothing in the economic sphere is developing better than the energy dialogue, which was 
established in 2000. While the EU insists on the adoption and ratification of the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) and its Transit Protocol, the relations on energy matters are 
supervised by the vague road map and bilateral agreements. 
Nevertheless, the 50–page long Document on Road maps (EU-Russia: Road map 
for the 4 Common Spaces), of which 20 pages are devoted to the economic dialogue, 
does not have a single one actual mention of the term “free trade”, even in the long term 
perspective. The CSP RF 2007–2013 mentions it once in the following context: 
Thus the Federal Government [Russian] has emphasised its desire for closer ties with the EU, 
and the gradual establishment of the Common Economic Space should bring closer the 
ultimate goal of a free trade area. 
CSP RF 2007–2013: 10 
Thus, the Russian government is insisting on “equal treatment”, hoping for the 
creation of the free–trade area, while the EU is purposefully trying to avoid using the 
“free trade” expression and thus give false promises, getting itself in some kind of a 
rhetorical entrapment. Instead the vague terms ‘harmonisation’ and ‘convergence’ are 
used throughout the documents, and it remains unanswered, who is harmonizing what 
and to what? In general, the economic, or may be it is better to say the energy dialogue is 
much more institutionalized, frequent and practical, comparing to the other dialogues9. 
                                                 
8 The Textiles Agreement was concluded in 1998. The Steel Agreement is renewed every year. (Europa 
Web. The EU’s relations with Russia. http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/intro/) 
9 For example, the latest meeting of the Russian Energy Minister Viktor Khristenko and Energy 
Commissioner Andris Piebalgs took place on the 26th of April 2007 in Brussels, where the parts agreed on 
the restructuring the EU–Russia energy dialogue thematic groups. Before that the Minister and 
Commissioner met at the European Council on March 9th 2007 (Europa Press Releases. EU and Russia 
restructure their energy dialogue with three new working groups).  
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1.1.4 The Asymmetry 
The dialogue between the EU and Russia is becoming more and more frequent 
comparing to co-operation between the EU and other actors (Lynch, 2005: 25); but this 
dialogue discusses mainly the Russian exports of gas and oil, its amount and new 
projects, like the new Baltic pipeline “North Transgas”. Moreover, if one looks at the 
main documents within the discussed relationship, almost 180 pages of the PCA and, for 
example, the Communication from the Commission on the relations with Russia in 2004 
(COM (2004) 106) cover mostly economic and trade matters – in rather vague form, 
without giving the precise details and strategies. More recent documents, like the CSP 
RF 2007–2013 and the Road map for the 4 Common Spaces try to cover all 4 Common 
spaces, but in a very vague way again: for example, the ‘frozen conflicts’ are not named, 
the official text can not go beyond the use of the “regions adjacent to the EU and Russian 
borders” (EU-Russia: Road map for the 4 Common Spaces: 32, 34, 39). Moreover, there 
is only an objective to generally secure these ‘adjacent regions’, without any strategy, on 
how exactly to co-operate. 
Thus, the vivid example of the asymmetrical development of relations could be 
seen even in official documents. When it comes to political affairs, the dialogue becomes 
too sensitive: neither of the actors is speaking out loud, or may be they simply do not 
want to? This rather ambiguous relationship seem to satisfy both the EU and Russia: 
The four common spaces are indeed a manifestation of the “proliferation of the fuzzy”. 
Emerson, 2005: 3 
This is the dilemma of special relationships; they tend to produce second-best or shallow 
preliminary agreements. Not even growing economic and energy interdependence is 
encouraging Brussels or Moscow to rethink the current paradigm in favor of a deeper 
commitment to more substantial arrangements [emphasis added]. 
Roberts, 2007: 48 
All in all, the relationship between the EU and Russia is not developing evenly in 
all spheres. Now the research will turn to the sphere, which renders relations more and 
more uneven and creates the “economic and energy interdependence”. 
1.2 The Interdependence of Russia and the EU 
1.2.1 The Dependence of Russia on the EU 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly born Russian Federation was 
submerged into the political chaos, economic decline, huge wave of inflation and the 
necessity to radically reform the economic, political and legal systems. Factories were 
closing, shelves in the stores were empty and people discouraged. At that time Russia 
chose to count on rich oil and gas resources and massive imports of food and other 
goods. The major crisis of 1998 did not wait to happen, when the prices for oil reached 
their lowest mark in 30 years: the GDP decreased by 6%. It took the Russian economy 
and ordinary people several years to recover. But nevertheless, the lesson was not 
learned: the Russian Government still counts on raw materials, oil and gas. Especially 
with the high prices for oil worldwide, Russia is tempted to earn “easy money” by selling 
oil and gas (“petrodollars” or “neftedollary” in Russian). 
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To make it more clear, the economic data should be used to illustrate, how much 
does Russia depend on the oil, fuel and gas exports. In general, the EU today accounts for 
48.6% of Russia’s foreign trade (Karaganov – Bordachev – Guseinov – Lukyanov – 
Suslov, 2005: 5). 35.3% of GDP forms through export of goods and services (The World 
Bank statistics. Russian Federation at a glance), while 65–67.6% of all Russian exports 
are oil, fuel and gas (Economic structure. Country Profile: Russia. The Economist 
Intelligence Unit; The World Bank statistics. Data and statistics for the Russian 
Federation. Macroeconomic Indicators). Some elementary calculations of this data lead 
us to the following conclusion: the contribution of the energy exports to GDP of Russia 
is around 24%. According to Christian Cleutinx, the European Commission Coordinator 
of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, and the European Commission, the Russian exports 
to the EU-25 are 63% of all oil exported and 65% of all gas exported (Presentation of 
Christian Cleutinx, October 2005). Thus, it is possible to make a rough estimation that 
15% of Russian GDP depends on exporting oil and gas to the EU10.  
At first glance this share of EU exports in GDP does not seem to be big enough to 
claim that Russia depends on EU. But there is another side of the story, which can 
change the picture radically. Taking into consideration the data for Gazprom11 incomes, 
we can see that out of all gas production only 37% is exported (mainly to Europe), but 
these 37% bring almost 65% of income (see Figure 1). Thus, Russian internal usage and 
trade of energy (gas in this case) gives much less profit if any at all, and is extremely 
inefficient12.  
Figure 1. Importance of the European market for Russian econmy. Sales and 
income of Gazprom. 
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Volume of gas sold
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Europe and other Russia
Source: Presentation of Christian Cleutinx, Novembre 2006 
                                                 
10 These numbers might be slightly different if to take into consideration the new member states of the EU 
– Romania and Bulgaria, but the difference is not crucial, as these countries are not the biggest consumers 
of Russian oil and gas. 
11 Gazprom is a monopolistic Russian company and the biggest extractor of natural gas in the world, which 
is cherished by V.Putin as a “sole exporter of gas” of Russia (A bear at the throat, 2007. The Economist). It 
accounts for about 93% of Russian natural oil production and owns 16% of world’s gas reserves. 
http://www.gazprom.ru/eng/ 
12 The energy intensity of gas consumption in Russia is 23 times bigger than in the EU (though the EU is 
more than 3 times the population of Russia), and 7 times bigger in electricity consumption (Presentation of 
Christian Cleutinx, November 2006;). Even if to take into consideration the severe climate conditions on 
the biggest part of the Russian Federation, the difference in consumption is still shocking. 
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The dependence of Russia on oil and gas becomes more and more important if to 
take into consideration the World Natural Resources Reserves data: only 6% of all world 
oil reserves belong to Russia and 26% of gas, but still Russia relies so much on them 
(Presentation of Christian Cleutinx, Novembre 2006). According to the World Bank 
statistics the GDP growth of Russia has been between 5,1–7,3% from 1999 to 2006 (The 
World Bank statistics. Data and statistics for the Russian Federation. Macroeconomic 
Indicators). This growth mostly depended on the oil and gas prices in the world. 
Meanwhile, some scientists predict that in the forthcoming years the growth of GDP in 
Russia might reduce to 4,8–5,0% (The World Bank statistics. Russian Federation at a 
glance). In this situation, the Russian Government still relies on the energy sector. 
Analysing the dependence of Russia on energy export, it should be pointed out 
that there are strong dependence links not only with the EU, but as well with the 
neighbouring countries, which are involved in transferring gas and oil to the countries of 
the EU, namely Ukraine and Belarus. These countries play a very important role as the 
‘connecting–link’ between the EU and Russia in their energy supplies.Not only Russia 
depend on these countries: the EU’s dependence is crucial as well.  
1.2.2 The Dependence of the EU on Russia  
It is a great mistake to look only at the dependence of the Russian state’s budget and 
GDP on Europe, the other side of the story is the dependence of the European Union on 
the natural resources (oil and gas) imported from Russia. The statistical data speaks for 
itself: almost one third of the oil imports and half of natural gas imports into the EU 
originate from Russia (see Figure 2). This means that Russia provides 20% of the total 
consumption of gas in the EU (Khaytun, 2006) and 25% of oil (EU-Russia Energy 
Dialogue. April 24, 2007. AurActiv). 
Figure 2. The origins of imports into the EU-27 
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Source: Presentation of Christian Cleutinx, Novembre 2006; Presentation of Christian Cleutinx, 
October 2005. 
However, the situation of dependence is very different in various countries, as 
some of the EU states do not depend on Russian gas at all, whereas others fully depend 
on it13 (see Figure 3). 
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13 For example, the dependency on Russian gas of such countries as Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania 
and Finland is 100%, whereas Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and 
Figure 3. Major European Recipients of Russian Natural Gas Exports, 2005  
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Source: DOE. EIA. Country Analysis Briefs. Russia. Natural Gas. April 2007. 
The general dependency of the EU on Russian energy turns out to be around 34-
40% (DOE. EIA. Country Analysis Briefs. Russia. April 2007). This number increases 
worries of the EU officials and creates a need to encourage a new agreement with Russia, 
which would ensure transparency, safety and at least some guarantees in energy dialogue. 
The Ukrainian – Russian gas dispute in 2005 – beginning of 2006 showed how sensitive 
the European Union is (at least in the short run) to any changes in the Russian policy and 
decisions14. The story somewhat repeated in 2006 – 2007 with the Belarus – Russian 
energy dispute, which was complicated by the dispute for oil15. This controversy 
however did not have a major impact on the European countries (not like the gas supplies 
the year before that), as each country, a member of the International Energy Agency 
(IEA), has to have 90-days emergency reserves. Nevertheless, both of these cases give 
the clear understanding, that the EU depends not solely on Russian decision making, but 
on the Ukrainian and Belorussian as well16. At the same time,  
Russian-Belarusian negotiations on gas and oil have also proven that not only is a gas 
customer dependent on the deliveries, but also the supplier is dependent on a transit country. 
Konończuk, 2007: 8 
                                                                                                                                                 
United Kingdom do not depend on Russian gas at all (US Department of Energy (DOE). Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). Country Analysis Briefs. Russia. Natural Gas. April 2007). At the same 
time, the biggest economy in the EU – Germany – though being the biggest importer of Russian gas (1291 
bcf/year), is not the most dependant on it – only by 43% (see Figure 1) 
14 The Ukrainian cutoff of gas by Gazprom in January 2006 for 4 days influenced the gas supply to such 
countries as Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Austria, Italy, France and Germany (the supply 
decreases were different from one country to another: from around 24 to 33%). (DOE. EIA. Country 
Analysis Briefs. Russia. Maps. April 2007) 
15 The sides managed to reach the agreement on gas before the ‘Moscow threatened deadline’ – the 1st of 
January. Whereas the oil dispute ended with cutoff of Russian oil supplies to Belarus for 3 days in January 
2007 and hard negotiations. 
16 In theory Russia gets the profit out of the co-operation with the EU, and thus is expected to act rational, 
unlike the transit countries, which are not the primary recipients of profit in these relations, and can not be 
expected to be rational. 
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The disputes between Russia and its neighbours showed Europe the rough tactics 
the Russian government is ready to undertake to reach its goals, hence the EU becomes 
more and more worried because of its dependency on Russian gas and oil. In this light 
the concepts of sensitivity and vulnerability of the EU and Russia become of crucial 
importance. 
1.2.3 Concepts of Sensitivity and Vulnerability 
Both the EU and Russia are rather sensitive towards any changes in the policies of the 
other part. In the worst case scenario of breaking the relations, both actors would lose 
radically. Thus, each side of this partnership is definitely sensitive to any changes or 
events happening within the other, and the level of sensitivity, as it is defined by Joseph 
Nye Jr. and Robert Keohane, might be somewhat the same. The vulnerability makes the 
difference. As Nye and Keohane put it, “[the] vulnerability rests on the relative 
availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors face” (Keohane–Nye, 
2001: 11). In order to analyse the vulnerability of Russia and the EU, it is useful to try to 
make a prognosis, whether both actors have any other variants of getting gas and oil (in 
case of the EU) and profits and investments (in the case of Russia). 
First, does the EU have other options to provide imports of gas and oil? As it was 
mentioned before, Russia possesses only 6% of world’s oil and 26% of gas, while the 
biggest reserves of both gas and oil are in the Middle East (40,8% and 63,3% 
respectively) (Presentation of Christian Cleutinx, October 2005). The Middle East 
geographically is not further from the EU than Russia is. One can argue that it is a 
difficult region where a lot of investments are needed in order to develop the capacities. 
Co-operation with the countries of the Middle East would never be simple, but if one 
takes into account the worst case scenario of the relations with Russia breaking down 
(the scenario of confrontation), these relations would definitely not be any more difficult 
than contacts with Russia. Thus, the EU is definitely sensitive to the changes of Russian 
policies, but the level of vulnerability is rather arguable. It should be compared to the 
vulnerability of Russia towards the change in the relations with the EU and halting of 
trade (as a worse scenario). 
It is a mistake for governments in the West to believe that they need Russian energy supplies 
more than Russia needs the oil and gas revenue that comes from Western markets. Russia 
does not have the capital or technology to develop its vast energy fields without assistance 
from the West.  
(Smith, 2006: 2) 
Europe as a whole and the EU in particular is the wealthiest neighbour of Russia, 
thus Russia would have rather noticeable difficulties in finding another partner which 
would be ready to buy as much gas and oil and for the same price. The United States, 
which is the biggest world consumer of oil, might be interested in tighter co-operation, 
but transaction costs might be very high. Japan might be the only wealthy country in the 
neighbourhood of Russia, which does not possess many natural resources by itself. But at 
present it survives perfectly well without Russian gas, importing most of its gas from 
Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Qatar and the EAE (DOE. EIA. Country Analysis 
Briefs. Japan. Natural Gas. December 2006). The only possible options would be China, 
Mongolia and other countries of Asia, which probably would never make as profitable a 
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partnership as the EU17. As Sergei Medvedev says, “[to] put it bluntly, if Russia turns 
away from the West, she has nowhere else to go, economically or politically” 
(Medvedev, 2000: 72). 
[In] this mutually dependent relationship the EU is not quite mutually dependent. Russia 
really has nowhere else to sell its gas and certainly no other such rich market. The EU by 
contrast has the financial capacity to make other arrangements. There is in fact plenty of gas 
in the world, it can be shipped in by LNG and alternative fuels to gas can be employed. The 
EU acting in concert has the means to offer Russia a convincing powerful future for its gas 
industry. However, it also has the means, if Russia refuses the offer to walk away and to 
reduce Russia to the supplier of last resort. 
(Riley, 2006: 8) 
Thus, the EU, though vulnerable, seems to be less vulnerable to changes than 
Russia. As J. Nye and R. Keohane argue, “the ability of the less vulnerable to manipulate 
or escape the constraints of an interdependent relationship at low cost is an important 
source of power” (Keohane – Nye, 1998). But we definitely cannot observe the 
‘manipulation’ from the side of the EU, rather the opposite: EU officials are very delicate 
and polite while Russia undertake such moves as cutting off the gas in Ukraine. As Nye 
and Keohane continue their argument, saying that the limits of the interdependence 
between one more vulnerable and one less vulnerable actor are that it “by itself cannot 
explain bargaining outcomes” (Keohane–Nye, 2001: 16). Thus, there are other factors 
that influence asymmetrical relations, besides the interdependence between the EU and 
Russia. 
*** 
In the very end of this part of the paper, it is important to define the 
interdependence between the EU and Russia more precisely. Taking the “complex 
interdependence” as a starting point (as this type of interdependence is peculiar to the age 
of globalisation and information), we can notice that the EU–Russian interdependence 
lacks some of the essential characteristics of “complex interdependence”: multiple 
channels are not very well developed between the EU and Russia (though they do exist to 
some extent); the energy issue is the main subject of co-operation and interdependence, 
thus the hierarchy of issues does exist; and military force remains important for Russia. 
But as Nye and Keohane argue, though the information age developed the links and 
channels between the actors,  
[military] force still plays a significant role in relations between states, and in a crunch, 
security still outranks other issues in foreign policy. … [Outside] the democratic zone of 
peace, the world of states is not a world of complex interdependence. In many areas, realist 
assumptions about the dominance of military force and security issues remain valid. 
(Keohane – Nye, 1998) 
The contradictions between the real-life EU–Russia interdependence and the ideal 
type of the information age “complex interdependence” brings us to the conclusion that 
Russia does not fit in the circle of the “democratic zone of peace”. This raises the 
question: what kind of interdependence and relationship in general can develop between 
the “democratic zone of peace” and its outside? This turns the paper to the discussion of 
the EU and Russia as polities. 
                                                 
17 For example, China insists on the price of 40 dollars per cubic meter (Khramchikhin, 2006) 
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2 The Study of Polities 
The “democratic zone of peace” (Keohane – Nye, 1998) or “democratic peace” 
understood in the sense it was introduced by Kant, is referred today by many scientists to 
the European Union, where already 27 nations peacefully coexist, and moreover co-
operate and unite on many topics. This polity has not much in common with the 
traditional Russian statehood and understanding of the world. 
Why is the study of polities important? Following the argument of Markus 
Jachtenfuchs and Beate Kohler-Koch that “polity determines politics and policy” 
[emphasis added] (Jachtenfuchs – Kohler-Koch, 2004: 101), we can argue that the 
relations between the EU and Russia depend a lot on what kind of polities they are.  
The polities of the EU and Russia will be analysed within three dimensions: 
governance, actorness and culture. The governance18 is referred to the political structure, 
the regime type and decision-making. Discussion of the actorness will include the 
analyses of the EU as a collective actor on the world arena in general and in the relations 
with Russia in particular: can the EU as a polity be defined as a collective actor in these 
relations or do the interests of member states still play the most important part in shaping 
the policies? Within the cultural paradigm the values, political culture and historical 
backgrounds will be analysed. 
2.1 Governance of the Polities. 
2.1.1 Governance of the EU 
There are several distinctive features of the governance of the European Union. First of 
all, the EU is a multi-level governance polity. The EU consists of 27 member states and 
their role in the existence of the EU is crucial. This paper concentrates on the governance 
approach in order to better characterise the EU as a polity, using the multi-level 
governance model (Caporaso, 1996; Caporaso – Keeler. 1995; Hooghe, 1996; Hooghe – 
Marks, 2001; Jachtenfuchs – Kohler-Koch, 2004; Scharpf, 1994), which states that the 
EU is a polity, “in which authority and policy-making influence are shared across 
multiple levels of government – subnational, national, and supranational” (Hooghe – 
Marks, 2001: 2). All political arenas are interconnected and none are dominating.  
In short, the locus of political control has changed. Individual state sovereignty is diluted in 
the EU by collective decision making among national governments and by the autonomous 
                                                 
18 There is a deliberate use of the term ‘governance’, not government. Due to the uniqueness of the EU 
(“[the] [European] Union is a unique polity, with no government or opposition, and powerful policy-
makers…”[emphasis added] (Peterson, 2004: 119)), there is, by the highest standards, not much to 
compare within the notion ‘government’. Moreover, the study of Russian government will not give us 
much information due to its secrecy and lack of transparency. 
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role of the European Parliament, the European Commission, the European Court of Justice, 
and the European Central Bank. 
Hooghe – Marks, 2001: 3 – 4 
At the same time, although the supranational institutions have their share in 
decision-making, the competition for power usually takes place on the national and sub 
national levels. Another important characteristic of the EU as a polity in this frame is that 
“the EU does not possess the two most important sources of power: the legitimate use of 
physical force and independent taxation” (Jachtenfuchs – Kohler-Koch, 2004: 102). 
Second, the EU faces the problem of speaking with one voice. All member states 
in the Union are equal, and thus have a very strong voice in all matters, making the voice 
of ‘all-Europe’ for the outside quieter.  
Thirty years ago, Henry Kissinger posed the question: “Whom do I call when I want to speak 
to Europe?” Now, the former U.S. secretary of state says: “I think one knows whom to call; I 
don't think Europe has yet decided how to give answers to all the questions”. 
Bilefsky – Knowlton, 2007
Thus, even appointing the High Representative of the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, does not solve the ‘problem of voices’: at times contradictory interests of 
the states and their ‘loud voices’ still do not allow to answer in one voice on matters in 
foreign affairs. The problem of consistency or coherence is still not solved, both on the 
level of the supranational institutions (‘horizontal’ and ‘institutional’ consistence), and 
between the member states (‘vertical’ consistency) (Nuttall, 2005: 91—112). 
Third, one of the main characteristics of the EU is networking19. In simple words, 
in the EU the culture of dialogue and consultation is spread, the decisions are made 
through “negotiation and the exchange of resources and ideas” (Peterson, 2004: 124), 
which take place in policy networks. 
Fourth, the EU is based on the democratic values of freedom, equality and 
justice20. Although there is a lot of critique of the European Union’s ‘transnational 
democracy’ (Chryssochoou, 2000) due to the ‘democratic deficit’ (Follesdal – Hix, 2006; 
Hix, 2005: 175—207; Bellamy, 2006), the European values, the principles of work, the 
negotiation and decision-making procedures can not be called other than democratic. It is 
strongly connected to the concept of borders of the EU. Fifth, the EU has ‘fuzzy borders’ 
(Christiansen, 2005: 13). The borders become more and more ambiguous inside of the 
entity (Christiansen – Jørgensen, 2000), and the external borders are becoming blurred as 
well and are referred to as “fuzzy borders” (Christiansen, 2005: 13; Christiansen–Tonra–
Petito, 2000; Friis–Murphy, 1999), and replace the traditional realist ‘frontier politics’: 
The meaning of inter-state borders has changed quite radically over the centuries of the 
Westphalia system. 
Brown, 2000: 199 
The ‘export’ of integration towards the outside, and the numerous exemptions from 
integrative measures and policies on the inside, have created a polity with ‘fuzzy borders’. 
                                                 
19 Policy network is “a cluster of actors, each of which has an interest or “stake” in a given … policy sector 
and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure” (Bomberg – Peterson, 1999: 8). 
20 “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and the rule of law” (Treaty on European Union, Article 6-1) 
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Christiansen, 2005: 13 
The launched European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) aims to escape the new 
dividing lines between Europe and its surroundings. Its goal is to build a “ring of 
friends” (Prodi, 2002) around the Union, and it is willing to help its neighbours to reach 
“prosperity, stability and security” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006). Thus, through ENP the EU 
is using its ‘soft power’ (Nye, 2004) for spreading the values and peace to the 
surrounding countries, what as well can be considered a smart security move: “The 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) is founded on the premise that by helping our 
neighbours we help ourselves” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2005). 
All in all, the EU is a unique post-modern polity, based on values of equality, 
freedom and peace; a polity, in which the notion of borders as such has changed: 
“borders as spaces rather than lines, that … bring together rather than divide” 
(Christiansen, 2005: 16). 
2.1.2 Governance of Russia 
Comparing, or rather contrasting the Russian governance to the European, will be held 
with the same logic as above, thus making the clear contrasts between the two polities in 
the terms of governance. 
Hence, first of all, the Russian Federation is the state of centralized governance. 
Since the collapse of Communism, it has not always been centralized, but rather opposite 
in the course of 1990’s (Medvedev, 2000: 23—41). During the presidency of Boris 
Yeltsin the regions and peripheries were acquiring more and more powers after the 
famous phrase of Yeltsin in Tatarstan: “Take sovereignty as much as you can swallow” 
(Païn, 2002) and the “parade of sovereignties” of the regions and republics within the 
Russian Federation in 1991 – 1994. Nowadays, this has radically changed. Moreover, 
Nikolai Petrov, a Russian researcher, expresses the following about the ‘Russian 
Federalism’: 
Like Russian democracy, Russian federalism has many elements that are decorative rather 
than substantive and that appear similar to their Western analogues but have a different 
essence. Russian federalism serves as a ritual rather than as a function. 
Petrov, 2004: 213 
Petrov argues that Vladimir Putin was and is pursuing the ‘antifederal reform’, 
“designed to take away or circumscribe most powers exercised by regional leaders” 
(Petrov, 2004: 227), making the unitary “vertical” executive power in the own words of 
Vladimir Putin (Putin, 2000; Putin, 2001). One of the measures for “strengthening the 
vertical of power” (Putin, 2004) was the abolition of the direct elections of governors of 
the regions of the Russian Federation in 2004 under the slogan of improving democracy 
and security (Putin, 2004)21. This leads to the second feature of Russia as a polity: the 
inside voices are becoming quieter, whereas the single one, central voice is powerful 
                                                 
21 In 2008 the last directly elected governor’s term will be over, putting all the regions under the 
government of Putin’s/president’s appointees. In Bryansk region the first round of last governor’s elections 
was held on the 5th of December 2004, whereas the new regulation on appointing the governors came into 
force on the 15th of December 2004. Thus, Nikolai Denin is the last ‘directly elected governor’ in Russia, 
who won by 77,83% in the second round on the 23rd of December 2004 (Nikolai Denin becomes the 
Governor of the Bryansk region. December 23, 2004). The other question arises, were these elections the 
true free elections: Denin is a member of the party “Edinaya Rossia” (“United Russia”). 
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both inside of the country and outside. Besides the governor’s ‘muteness’, the voices of 
the other actors – corporations and companies – are either not heard, or sound in 
harmony with the leading part22.  
Putin’s goal to build a “strong vertical of the executive power” also leads to the 
third feature of Russia as a polity: strong hierarchy in the governance. It could be also 
explained looking at the KGB past of Vladimir Putin, where the main emphasis is made 
on “discipline, order and hierarchy” (Petrov, 2004: 227). Now the Russian ruling elites 
are full of what in Russian is called ‘siloviki’ (people from military, police or security 
service), who definitely support the idea of hierarchy and order, seeing the country as an 
analogue of a big military composition (Roberts, 2007: 37).  
Forth, Russia has an ambiguous quasi-democratic regime with authoritarian 
traits, which can be called “managed democracy”, “managed pluralism” (Balzer, 2003: 
198–220) or even more than that – “sovereign democracy”. “Managed democracy” is 
denied by Vladimir Putin to exist in Russia only on the basis that “this is a democracy 
that is controlled from the outside” [emphasis added] (Putin, 2006a), but it does not make 
Russia not being under control from the inside, however Putin insists on calling Russia a 
democracy and not to question it: “Do not worry about how democracy is developing in 
Russia” (Putin, 2006a).  
Nikolai Petrov defines the following characteristics of the managed democracy of 
Russia: “strong presidency and weak institutions”, “state control of the media”, “visible 
short-term effectiveness and long-term inefficiency” and “control over elections which 
allows elites to legitimize their decisions” (Petrov, 2005). There is no workable party 
system23. This is the regime, which whirls around the President, who is the voice, the 
power, the decision-maker:  
Putin’s regime is openly czarist, a term more precise than “authoritarian,” which evokes the 
image of a traditional trains-running-on-time dictatorship. The defining element in present-
day Russia is that the presidency, or rather the president, a modern czar, is the only 
functioning institution. 
Trenin, Dmitri, 2005 
The notion “sovereign democracy” is the new ‘ought-to-be national idea’. The 
formula consists of ‘sovereignty’ which basically means non-interference from the West 
(Popescu, 2006: 1) and ‘democracy’ – another attempt to call the present regime 
democratic, to convince ordinary people that they are living in a democracy, based on a 
special set of vaues. “These values are democratic, but they emerge from Russia’s unique 
historical experience, and they are distinct from what the West understands as 
democracy” (Popescu, 2006: 1). It is a simple endeavour of the authorities to make 
people believe in the specialty of Russian history, culture, values, role in the world, and 
thus assure people that the West is just too ignorant to understand all this typical, 
                                                 
22 For example, there is a certain list of enterprises and joint-stock companies which are of strategic 
importance for the interests and security of the Russian state and the deals with which could be concluded 
only with the government’s/President’s permission: for example, one of the biggest newspapers 
“Komsomolskaya Pravda” is included in the list (Albats, 2006). 
23 The ‘party in power’ “United Russia” (‘Edinnaya Rossiya’) always supports all the decision of the 
President, gets the majority of voters’ support and does not have opposition: how can a democratic regime 
be without parties? 
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exclusive, exceptionally Russian mentality. It is not simplistic Soviet propaganda 
anymore: 
It is the new face of ‘smart authoritarianism’ that speaks the language of Western norms and 
is very flexible, but has very little to do with the values of democracy, Eastern- or Western-
style. 
Popescu, 2006: 3 
Finally, fifth, the Russian state still has the perception of frontiers rather than 
borders, and definitely not “border spaces”. The borders should be well defined and 
fortified, “foreign policy remains dictated by old-fashioned conceptions of national 
interest (military presence dominates values such as the rule of law)” (Emerson, 2005: 3). 
Besides, Russia understands its neighbourhood “as an area predominantly marked by 
enmity and competition” (Makarychev, 2006: 39). 
2.1.3 Contrasts and clashes of the Governance of the EU and Russia 
The contrasts of the governance of the EU and Russia were brought together in Table 1. 
There could be only several last comments regarding the governance of polities. 
Table 1. Governance of the EU and Russia. 
The European Union The Russian Federation 
Multi-level governance: supranational, national, and 
subnational levels 
Centralized governance, with all decision-making 
powers in Moscow, Kremlin. 
Strong voices of the member states, but weak 
international voice: the dilemma of speaking with 
one voice 
Weak internal voices of the actors, strong voice on 
international arena: no other voices heard 
Policy networks Strict hierarchy in organizing political process 
Democracy “Sovereign democracy” 
“Fuzzy borders”: spreading the values, 
neighbourhood of friends 
Strict borders, frontiers: spreading the influence, 
dominance, military is important 
First of all, the democratic values are not really spelled out anywhere in the 
dialogue with Russia. Thus, in the absence of own set of democratic values or values 
imposed, it is creating its own ‘new’ values – quasi-democratic, or rather dressed in 
democratic clothes, which mainly provoke nationalism, ethnic chauvinism, protectionism 
and pride adjoining with ignorance. All these have nothing to do with “being friends” or 
“peaceful coexistence”. Second, particular attention should be paid to the differences of 
concepts of borders and views of neighbours:  
The ‘symbolic order’ which the EU is seeking to attain presumably boils down to a 
‘(European) Self versus (Neighbouring) Friends’ scheme, while the Russian constellation 
seems to be dominated by a ‘(Russian) Self versus (Neighbouring) Enemy’ formula. 
[emphasis added] 
Makarychev, 2006: 18 
The divergences are most important and “especially deep where the EU’s 
‘neighbourhood’ overlaps with Russia’s ‘near abroad’” (Emerson, 2006: 3). Thus it 
explains the difficult relations of Russia with Ukraine, Baltic states, Belarus, as besides 
the “enemy formula” it also has the sensitive feeling of possession towards these regions. 
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Hence, the relations between the EU and Russia become increasingly important for their 
common neighbourhood: these countries somehow depend on the development of this 
relationship as they lie geographically and politically right in between the two. 
2.2 Actorness of the Polities 
2.2.1 The EU as an Actor 
The international ‘actorness’ and ‘presence’ of the European Union are broadly analysed, 
these studies focus on ‘actor capacity and capability’ (Sjöstedt, 1977; Hill, 1996; 
Caparoso – Jupille, 1998; Rhodes, 1998). Caproso and Jupille introduce four criteria for 
evaluating actorness: recognition, authority, autonomy and cohesion (Caparoso – Jupille, 
1998; Ginsberg, 2001: 47). It is not relevant for this paper to go deeply into this analysis, 
but what is important for this research is the recognition of the EU as an actor, especially 
by Russia. 
Recalling the abovementioned concentration of Russian foreign policy on “old-
fashioned conceptions of national interest” (Emerson, 2005: 3), it is possible to make a 
conclusion that the variables that matter for Russia in becoming/being an actor in the 
world politics herself – the exact same variables are used for defining other entities as 
actors. Thus, Russia might look at the EU in geopolitical terms:  
While it is clear that the EU is a considerably more powerful economic entity than Russia, 
the EU is not yet a significant player in terms of geopolitics. … From a Russian perspective, 
the “incomplete” nature of the EU as an international actor reduces the relevance of having 
strategic relations with it “on the basis of equality”. Although the geopolitical situation in 
Europe continues to be the principal focus of Russia’s foreign policy, it has so far preferred 
to deal with the bigger EU members on a bilateral or “minilateral” basis …, rather than the 
EU as such. 
Vahl, 2001: 5–6 
At the same time it is all too easy to blame only Russia for creating this view of 
the EU as an actor. The EU itself definitely lacks coherence and consistency of the 
strategy towards Russia, as well as the whole Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) suffers from this problem. The simple example is the process of how the 
Common Strategy on Russia was created:  
…the negotiation method used in drafting the document … can be best described as a 
‘Christmas tree method’. Once the general principles, the bulk of the tree, were in place the 
member states were allowed to add their own decorations to the strategy [emphasis added]. 
Haukkala – Medvedev, 2001: 50 
In such a way the most important strategy agreement on Russia in the EU lacks 
agreements in sensitive issues, as well as a clear definition of priorities, goals and aims. It 
is as vague as the PCA: the EU still cannot decide unilaterally what to do with its big 
neighbour and how. There are a lot of answers to this question, almost each country 
within the EU can answer it, but in its own way. Russia has particularly special relations 
with Germany; sharing some very discrepant past with Eastern Europe and especially the 
Baltic states, Russia is on a special list of these countries’ foreign affairs. Thus, 
everything that is left out by the EU as a collective actor, is managed on a bilateral basis, 
and it is still probably the biggest part of the co-operation between Russia and Europe. 
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Besides, the discordance of the member states can be aggravated by the very complex 
institutional framework of the CFSP, where every institution has its place. 
2.2.2 Russia as an Actor 
First of all, Russia is perceived as a unitary actor on the world arena, personified in the 
face of her President. Due to the governance and regime discussed above, all other actors 
within Russia gradually lose their voice.  
Second, there is no doubt that Russia is an actor, but what kind of actor? The 
Russian economy is 20 times smaller than the economy of the EU, thus it cannot claim 
for itself a position as an important economic actor on the world arena. Moreover, 
according to Vahl,  
[the] only significant remaining source of international influence [of Russia] is … its 
weakened but still considerable military forces, in particular its nuclear arsenal which 
remains the second biggest in the world, and its position in international organisations such 
as the United Nations Security Council. 
Vahl, 2001: 6 
2.2.3 The Divergence of Actorness 
To sum up the actorness dimensions of the EU and Russia as polities, it should be said 
that the EU is definitely a strong economic actor, but not political or geopolitical, 
whereas Russia is a very weak economic actor and more a geopolitical actor. Thus, from 
the very beginning the two polities take two different niches on the world arena, which 
already makes it hard for them to communicate. 
2.3 The Role of Culture 
All the member states of the EU are very different in their everyday cultures, practices, 
mentalities, interaction between people, worldview, Christian traditions and so on (“unity 
in diversity”). But all of them share the same democratic values of freedom, equality, 
respect for human rights and the rule of law. Thus the main uniting culture of Europe is 
the culture of democracy. 
The case of Russia is different. First of all, the culture can definitely not be called 
democratic. Some scientists argue that the Russian culture is authoritarian or czarist by 
nature: the Russian history knows only czarist, then Communist totalitarian and now 
quasi–democratic/semi–authoritarian regimes. Before the Soviet Union czar or emperor 
was looked at and was called ‘a father’, later on Lenin was ‘a grandfather’ and Stalin ‘a 
father’ again, shall we call Putin a ‘big brother’ now?  
Second, scientists both from the EU and Russia “emphasise the ‘special Russian 
mentality’” (Karaganov – Bordachev – Guseinov – Lukyanov – Suslov, 2005: 3), and the 
Russian mentality includes the mysterious term ‘the Russian idea’ (Helleman, 2004; 
Petro, 1995: 88–112), which could not be rationally explained by Russians themselves 
(but rather on the level of senses and feelings), and of course impossible to be fully 
understood by foreigners. As far as the beginning of the 19th century the official national 
idea/motto was brought into every day life: “samoderzhavie – pravoslavie –narodnost” 
(Autocracy – Orthodoxy – Nationality) (Kantor, 1998: 23). It is easy to note that the 
formula lack the democratic component completely, moreover as Bibler argues, these are 
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“purely negative concepts” (Bibler, 1993: 63), which are always defining an enemy in the 
face of democracy in the whole (Bibler, 1993: 62).  
Keeping this idea in mind, some light could be shed on the somewhat 
understanding, why the Russian foreign policy is still driven by national interests and 
geopolitical claims for superiority; why the regime is turning more and more towards 
authoritarianism and Russian people do not protest it; why the culture of individualism 
(which could be a peculiar feature of the Western civilisation) has never been able to 
settle down in the Russian society and thus the outbreaks of individualism in the society 
of ‘narodnost’ and ‘community/collective values’ result in unequal practices of oligarchy 
and robbery. 
[They] [Russian people] always worked for “the stranger”, for Tatars, for a state budget, for 
the tsars, for lords, or for the Communist Party. Inability to do what one is not accustomed 
to, namely organizing the day’s affairs, leads to a desire for living by “the present moment”, 
at least until the fruit of one’s work is taken away. 
Kantor, 1998: 27 
This could also explain the inefficiency of Russian politics and economics in the 
long run, when the main goal is stability and prosperity in the present. This could also 
explain the little care for the environment and nature. 
Another feature of Russian culture is the historical ambiguity of Russia between 
the East and the West: 
Russia’s Eurasian nature and its position “as a world power situated on two continents” are 
commonly heard arguments against closer co-operation with Western Europe. 
Vahl, 2001: 16 
The construction of Russian identity throughout history shaped around the 
question, whether Russia is Western or Eastern? The answer to this question is till the 
present day undecided, and this causes the ambivalence and ambiguity of the Russian 
foreign strategy and internal reform as well. 
*** 
Several final remarks should be made in the analyses of Russia and the EU as 
polities. The differences of the two polities could be seen even without any deep analysis. 
But nevertheless, this analysis was carried out in order to try to locate any similarities 
between the two, which unfortunately failed. First of all, the governance is managed in 
very different, almost contrasting ways. This concerns first and foremost the democratic 
versus undemocratic regime of the polity. Second, the EU and Russia are both actors on 
the world arena, but they are occupying different niches, which makes it harder to 
communicate. Third, the cultural differences are striking, but again there is a pattern of 
democratic values versus somewhat anti-democratic values. 
Thus, the “post-modern” order of the European Union and a very realist, 
“modern” order of Russia are incredibly divergent; if there is nothing in common, it is 
probably almost impossible to find common grounds for ensuring trust between each 
other. Vahl argues that the acceptance by Russia of the Northern Dimension, and 
participation in the OSCE and the Council of Europe can be seen as “certain openness in 
Russia towards “post-modern” mechanisms of co-operation” (Vahl, 2001: 8). But how 
can be the withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) 
be seen then?  
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Following an argument that “polity determines politics and policy” (Jachtenfuchs 
– Kohler-Koch, 2004: 101), it is logical that the uniqueness of the EU as a polity 
influences the kind of policies it produces; the same could be noticed about Russia: its 
governance, culture and understanding of world politics as a polity result in certain 
policy outcomes. However, this is not all. Even more important is that the polity 
determines not only its internal policies and politics, but the policies and politics on 
world arena that are made by other actors of world politics. Thus, the EU polity 
influences the policies of Russia concerning its cooperation with EU and vice versa, the 
very essence of polity of Russia has an impact on the way the EU treats and builds 
relationship with Russia: 
The nature and direction of the evolution of the European Union, its institutional structure 
and the decision-making process have immense significance for the formulation by Russia of 
its ultimate goal with regard to its relations with the EU. 
Karaganov – Bordachev – Guseinov – Lukyanov – Suslov, 2005: 2 
Now if we look at the kind of strategies both of the observed parts have towards 
each other, it could be noticed that the only word which can describe them is ambiguity, 
moreover, it is dual ambiguity. Both the EU’s and Russia’s strategy lack clarity in their 
goals and aims, they do not have adequate strategic agendas. One of the reasons is the 
polities. As both of them influence the policy outcomes of each other, and these 
outcomes are ambiguous in both cases, this means that both the EU sees Russia as a 
polity rather ambiguously, and vice versa, Russia does not understand the EU as a polity. 
The Russian openness towards the “post-modern” nature seems very unlikely, as living 
in a modern reality, post-modernism cannot be fully understood. Meanwhile, the EU 
cannot understand the Russian culture, the ‘Russian idea’, the Russian place in Europe, 
constructing a rather ambiguous image of it for Europe. Thus, the second reason could be 
the clash and ambiguity of images, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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3 The Study of Images 
In the world ruled by mass media it is perceptions and images that count, not the actual 
territorial/strategic wins and losses.  
Medvedev, 2000: 60 
In interpersonal communication the image of a person in the eyes of others is the main 
determinant of their attitudes towards him or her. The same assumption could be made in 
the field of the World Politics, where states are actors and images of each other among 
other things determine the relations between them. Moreover, in order to understand the 
mutual relations between two actors, it is essential to figure out the difference between 
the ‘desired image’ of an actor and the ‘constructed in the reality’ image, thus, the 
perception of the image by outside actors. In this discussion the study of constructing 
‘the other’ is as well essential. 
3.1 Identity, Image, and Constructing the ‘Other’ 
The main attention in the paper will be paid to the images, which are part of the 
construction of identity24. Identity and images do not just exist “out there”, they are 
being constructed by social interactions and historical outcomes, people’s cognitive and 
affective interpretations of the reality around them. According to Bo Petersson, national 
self-images are “cognitive and affective conceptual lenses, organizing devices and 
information filters which partly represent, and partly inform national identity” 
(Petersson, 2001: 7). The self-images will be only briefly touched upon, with the main 
emphasis on the ‘ought-to-be self images’, or rather ‘desired self-images’ – the image of 
the polity that the citizens and officials would like to have projected on other countries of 
the world – and the way these images are perceived, what image does the polity has in 
the eyes of the other polity. 
Thus, the study of images will proceed as follows. First, their historical 
importance of images will be analysed: the construction of ‘other’ throughout history, 
based on research of Iver Neumann, will be explored. Second, taking off from the ground 
of ‘self/other’ analysis, both the desired and constructed in reality images of the EU and 
Russia will be researched. 
3.2 Europe and Russia: Constructing the ‘Other’ 
If we look back in history, the relations between Russia and Europe has never been 
simple: Russia has always been close to the territories of the European states, but never 
                                                 
24 The analyses of identities is not in the centre of attention in this paper, though is important for 
understanding the subtle and ambiguous field of images, and will be referred to in the course of analyses. 
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close enough. The debate on the place of Russia in Europe has been present for more 
than five centuries. Interestingly, in the 16th–17th centuries the main questions and doubts 
were shaping around three determinants of Russia: Christianity, civility and the regime 
type (Neumann, 1999: 67–69). The only factor which was bringing Russia closer to 
Europe was Christianity, but at the same time it was Orthodox Christianity, which was in 
general also observed as the ‘other’. In general, Russia was considered more “Asiatic”, 
barbarous and despotic (Neumann, 1999: 69). Peter the Great changed the course of 
Russia in direction of more towards Europe and newly found Saint Petersburg became a 
symbolic “window on the West” (Neumann, 1999: 76). 
Interestingly enough, it is easy to notice, that to these days the debate on Russia 
has not stopped, moreover if to summarise all modern trends, they still proceed within 
the same questions of ‘Christianity, civility and regime’. The idea of “barbarian at the 
gate” of Europe (Neumann, 1997: 167) did not disappear from the discussion. The 
question of regime – too authoritarian, despotic, totalitarian? – is as well bothering all 
Westerners and Europeans. From the European point of view, Russia has always been 
catching up, backward, and still remains to be so (Medvedev, 2000: 98). The most 
important and most mentioned is the image of Russia as a ‘learner’: 
The view of Russia as a reticent and even unwilling learner, one who grudgingly adopts what 
he needs and turns his back on the rest, now seems to be ascendant. … [The] core idea 
remains that of a learner who lacks insight into his own need to learn… 
Neumann, 1997: 167 
Talking about the Russian construction of Europe, we can point out the long 
debate between ‘Slavophiles’ and ‘Westernizers’. Whereas Westernizers consider Russia 
European and think that Russia is and should be a part of Europe, 
[to] Slavophile thinking Russia is culturally and intellectually very different from Western 
Europe, which is regarded as individualistic and superficial compared to the collectivist 
Russian spirit and the profoundity of the famous “Russian soul”. 
Herslund, 2007: 164 
These two quite opposite movements and ideas have always been present in the 
debate in Russia, whether Russia is European or not; moreover these movements have 
never been equal, as the westernizers have always been outpowered by slavophiles25. 
Using Ola Tunander’s term of ‘constructing walls’ (Tunander, 1997: 26–31), the 
Russian–European and European–Russian views can be defined as constructing the walls 
between the two. Slavophiles acknowledge them and are happy about their existence, as 
in their view Russia has never belonged to Europe. Westernizers acknowledge the 
existence of these walls, but think “that walls are negotiable, that relations between 
Russia and Europe are characterized by the existence not only of walls but also of 
networks, and that one should follow a policy of maximizing the latter and minimizing 
the former” (Neumann, 1997: 157). Meanwhile, there has not been an “explicit wall 
imagery in European discourse on Russia” (Neumann, 1997: 168), but rather Russia as a 
periphery, a “barbarian”, the ‘other’. Thus, both in the Russian and European discourses 
the views of each other are the views of the ‘Other’, a ‘stranger’ (Petersson, 2006); the 
                                                 
25 Even today, President Putin talks about Russia’s special way, about the impossibility of simple 
projecting of western institutions and values on Russian realities (Putin, 2000; Putin, 2004). 
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image might be friendly or not, depending on the time in history, but the separation from 
each other is evident. 
3.3 The Image of Russia 
The image of Russia is very controversial. As it was shown above, the image and place 
of Russia has been controversial and ambiguous throughout history, nothing changed 
nowadays. Thus, the attempt will be made to understand what image in general does 
Russia have within the European officials’ circle (as at the end of the day, they form the 
policy and strategy and lead negotiations) and among usual citizens (as the interaction of 
civil societies is essential for relations). At the same time there is a crucial difference 
between the desired image and the real-life constructed image. 
3.3.1 The Image Constructed in Reality among Ordinary People 
The starting point for the discussion of images will be the analyses of the common EU 
citizens’ attitudes and images towards Russia. For this purpose the opinion polls will be 
used. Trying to find information concerning this, the author met a dead end: there were 
no clear surveys made among the European citizens on their attitudes towards Russia by 
any major European opinion polls measuring programs, including Eurobarometer26. 
To get an idea of the opinion of the EU citizens of Russia, the author conducted a 
survey among European citizens (see Appendix I and Appendix II). Most of the 
respondents have at least a Bachelor degree or are in the process of acquiring one (80%): 
thus, the survey will be used mainly as an illustration, but definitely not as a hard data for 
statistical evaluation. There are several main conclusions or rather ideas which could be 
figured out from the survey. First of all, there is definitely an interest in Russia: only 
14% of respondents stated that they would never want to visit Russia, 66% have never 
been there but would like to go27. Second, the personal attitudes of the Europeans are 
not as negative as it could have been expected or discussed in media: only 23% of the 
respondents have very negative or rather negative personal attitudes towards Russia, 36% 
are neutral and 41% are very positive or somewhat positive. Besides, the opinion of 
whether Russia should become a part of the European Union is rather dispersed: 45% are 
against and 40% are for it (at least in the long time perspective). Third, the image of the 
Russian President turns out to be very negative in most of respondents opinions, which 
probably influences the opinion on general attitude towards Russia in the EU: 69% of 
respondents have a very negative or rather negative attitudes towards Vladimir Putin, and 
64% think that general attitude among Europeans towards Russia is negative28.  
                                                 
26 The only slight mentioning of Russia in the European surveys was the survey on the ENP, where though 
Russia is voluntarily not a part of ENP, 57% of EU citizens still consider it a neighbour (The European 
Union and its Neighbours. Special Eurobarometer 259: 9–11). 
27 As the survey was conducted by a joint effort of two people (for two somewhat different research 
projects), not all questions are relevant for this study. But nevertheless, a question in the survey on the 
Russian campaign of the bid for the Winter Olympics 2014 is a good illustration of interest as well: only 
31% of respondents didn’t want to know more about it, all the rest either knew something or were 
interested in it. 
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28 There is a vivid dissonance between the personal attitudes and the general attitudes of other EU’s 
citizens, which could mean that despite all media talks and discussions on authoritarian regime in Russia, 
Though it is really hard (and would be a mistake) to generalize this survey, it 
nevertheless gives several ideas on the image of Russia in general. At the very same time, 
taking the associations of Russia into consideration, the picture becomes even more 
controversial: there are only two positive associations (it of course depends on what to 
consider positive or not): 19% of respondents mentioned Russian potential and 
opportunities for positive development and 16% touched upon rich culture and mystic 
nature, not understood Russian soul. Whereas the main associations are undemocratic 
regime (and no freedom of press) (35% mentioning), high rates of corruption (32%) (see 
Appendix II for more).  
All these observations and contradictions raise the question: why are there no 
official surveys on the Europeans’ attitudes towards Russia if Russia is a rather big case 
in the European political and economic life? There are several assumptions that could be 
made. First of all, the issue is so sensitive, that the officials do not want to bring the 
discussion to the very surface. Second, there is probably a fear of getting more negative 
results from a more representative sample (equivalents of those on attitudes towards 
Putin), which rather not be brought in public: the relations with Russia are sensitive and 
dependent.  
3.3.2 The Desired Image and Reality 
To analyse the ‘desired image’ of Russia, the speeches and officical documents were 
reviewed for determining signals, which the Russian officials are making. As it was 
mentined above, “signals are statements or actions the meanings of which are established 
by tacit or explicit understandings among actors” (Jervis, 1989: 18, 20-21). Several 
findings were made. 
First of all, Russian officials and rather Putin29 are always talking about Russia 
being democratic and following democratic principles and values: 
Russia is building its statehood on the basis of democratic values and freedoms, 
strengthening the civil society institutions consistently. 
Putin, 2006b 
Russia has made its choice in favor of democracy. Fourteen years ago, independently, 
without any pressure from outside, it made that decision in the interests of itself and the 
interests of its people – of its citizens. This is our final choice, and we have no way back. 
There can be no return to what we used to have before. And the guarantee for this is the 
choice of the Russian people, themselves. 
Putin, 2005a 
If the state is as democratic as Putin says, why is he still trying to persuade the 
Russian and foreign societies and officials, that Russia follows democratic values? The 
only answer could be because someone is still doubting, still questioning the fact which 
seems so obvious for Mr. Putin, for instance, the European and American politicians, 
ordinary people, scientists. The truth is that in reality Russia for several years is 
considered to be undemocratic, no matter what Putin is saying, no matter what signals he 
is trying to send. Since 2005 Freedomhouse put Russia in the list among ‘not free’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
and officials’ delicate expressions concerning Russia, the personal opinions of the Europeans on Russia 
itself, its culture and people might be positive. 
29 As it was mentioned before, Putin is a face and voice of Russia, thus mainly his speeches were analysed. 
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countries (Freedom in the world 2007), and mentioned in Chapter 2 reforms of regional 
and parliament elections, which are carried out under the slogan of ‘improving 
democracy’ (Putin, 2006a), do not encourage enthusiasm in the Western countries30. 
Second, Vladimir Putin in lots of cases seems to chose a more convenient way of 
presenting the Russian view and place in the world, depending on a situation, which 
sometimes create direct contradictions, for example, it is not new that V. Putin always 
states a special place for Russia in the world, considers it historically and culturally 
different from both Europe and Asia, but at the same time when talking about sensitive 
issues (migration policies, Chechnya, relations with Georgia, murder of Anna 
Politkovskaya), he tends to generalize Russia within Europe, saying that these issues are 
problems of all European countries (and Russia is among them) and sometimes even 
directly accusing Europe of something, making it easier to justify the doings of 
government (Putin, 2006b; Putin, 2005a; Putin, 2006c). This only adds to the confusion 
and dilemma on where to put Russia in the world: to the East or to the West?  
Third, in all speeches on most press conferences and in official statements 
Vladimir Putin vividly emphasizes the readiness of Russia and Russian government for 
compromise: 
We have every intention of engaging in a dialogue on an equal footing with our partners and 
of looking for compromise solutions where we think it possible, taking into account that our 
European partners will also give consideration to our national interests. 
Putin, 2005b 
I repeat that we are ready to look for solutions to this problem together with our Polish 
colleagues and friends [about the ban of Polish meat]. We do not want to dramatize or 
politicize this issue unduly. 
Putin, 2006c 
Nevertheless, the readiness for compromise does not seem to turn into action, as 
compromise means making some concessions, having to lose something and gain the 
other. Whereas it seems that the Russian government is not ready to give up anything. 
Even talking about visa facilitation, the dialogue is better to be called a monologue: 
Russia is asking for visa facilitation in the Schengen zone, while the Russian visa 
remains one of the most difficult to obtain (Schröder, 2003). And despite all the words 
being said, the compromises in gas and oil spheres are even less likely: strong 
protectionism is taking place. 
Fourth, Russia really longs to be trusted, wants to be seen as a trustworthy partner 
rather than a “messed-up” neighbour who needs help. That is why, Russia has always 
been trying to draw attention to the dependence of the EU on Russian gas and oil; 
recently it started to change, and the interdependence between the EU and Russia is now 
emphasized by Vladimir Putin.  
Europe, the European economy, covers one third of its total demand for oil with oil supplies 
from Russia – supplies that are delivered either directly or through intermediaries. … I would 
remind you that some European Union members cover 90 percent of their gas consumption 
needs with gas from Russia – 90 percent – but no one has complained so far. Everyone is 
                                                 
30 Even the ‘not-very-transparent’ (at least according to the European standard) energy sphere of Russian 
economy is argued to be for the reasons of democracy (Putin, 2006c); and probably the reasons of need for 
economic development and some protectionism would be understood, but ‘democratic argument’ is 
perceived simply preposterous. 
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happy. … Russia is a reliable partner and even during the most difficult periods in its 
economic development it never let down its partners in Europe. 
Putin, 2005b 
In reality, Putin has to say all these words for some reason. If the partners would 
consider Russia reliable and trustworthy, there would be no need in wasting words trying 
to convince someone of something. Besides, the investment climate is speaking for itself: 
Russia has huge potential, but investors just do not want to risk with the Russian 
uncertainty and unstableness (Presentation of Christian Cleutinx, Novembre 2006)31. 
To sum up all the findings and the reality attitudes, it is easy to see that the ‘sent’ 
image and the ‘perceived’ image of Russia are radically different, the ‘desired image’ 
remains the one only in words, and these words do not have an expected effect. 
Meanwhile, the actions and deeds of Russian government are better signs and even 
indices; in this case, actions, deeds and historical links and experiences (of Russia as the 
‘Other’) create the image, whereas the explanation of them does not matter. In general, 
Russia wants to be seen to be democratic, strong and powerful economically,32 a 
trustworthy and reliable partner, and in the eyes of European people and European 
officials it is neither. Too delicate to say it straight (or may be the situation is too 
sensitive?), the European officials follow the game of accepting the words, but not 
believing them, having an absolutely different image in reality: they have never 
developed a way to discuss ‘sensitive cases’. 
3.4 The Image of the EU 
Being a very complex polity, the EU has a rather compound image in the world. The 
image which will be of interest in this paper is the image of the EU in the eyes of Russian 
people – officials and common citizens. The analyses will follow the same logic as the 
analysis of the image of Russia: starting off with the citizens’ opinion, moving to signals 
and indices made by the officials. 
3.4.1 The Image Constructed in Reality among Ordinary People 
Building an image of the EU in the eyes of Russia must start off with the overview of 
Russian citizens’ opinion. This task turned out to be less difficult than to find opinion 
polls of European citizens concerning Russia: a lot of Russian research centres on 
conduct research of public opinion concerning the EU and the place of Russia in Europe 
– Levada-Centre, WCIOM (Russian Public Opinion Research Centre), FOM (Public 
Opinion Foundation). Nevertheless the survey was conducted by the author as well (it 
will be referred to as the Survey), in order to compare results and at the same time to 
have the same ground for reasoning as in the case of attitudes towards Russia (see 
Appendix III and Appendix IV). 
The first conclusion which could be made out of all opinion polls is that the 
general personal attitude towards the EU is more positive than negative: in the Survey 
                                                 
31 The case of Dutch Royal Shell on “Sakhalin 2” is an example of co-operation with Russia, when the 
alteration of conditions can radically change the Russian government attitude (Putin, 2006d). 
32 Russia wants to be seen not only military, as nowadays the hard power is becoming less and less 
favourable. 
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51% of respondents have positive or somewhat positive attitudes towards the EU and 
42% are neutral. According to Levada Centre opinion polls of 2006, 67% of people are 
positive towards the EU (Russia and the European Community Opinion Polls. Levada 
Centre)33. Second, the EU is not considered a unitary polity, but only an economic union 
(51% of respondents of the Survey), most people still prefer to refer to single countries, 
out of which the most friendly ones are Germany and France (Modern Germany with the 
eyes of Russia. Press release 436. WCIOM). Even looking at the associations connected 
with the EU, the most frequent one is the common market and euro as a single currency 
(30% mentioning). Third, nevertheless, 56% of respondents of the Survey consider the 
EU an important player in world politics, which can probably mean that for many 
Russians economics and economic strength defines world politics. Politically, the EU is 
not considered to be a threat for Russia (69%) and the findings of Bo Petersson, that “the 
traditional external threats from the days of the Cold War still seemed to hold sway” 
(Petersson, 2001: 95), are also proved by the public opinion (Russians about Europeans 
and Americans. FOM Database). 
In spite of the overall positive attitude of common Russian citizens towards the 
EU, one peculiarity can be noticed. Among the European names of businessmen and 
companies in the Survey such names as Bill Gates, Microsoft and Coca-Cola can be seen 
pretty often, which can definitely not be defined as European. Moreover, according to 
FOM opinion polls, only 48% of Russian population/respondents can answer correctly 
the question whether Russia is a part of the EU or not, 24% answer that it is and another 
28% do not know (Perspectives of European Integration: Russia and the European Union. 
FOM. 05.04.2007). This can not be called stupidity34, but rather ignorance and self-
absorption. Russian people in the majority are not interested in the European Union, in 
world politics, in politics in general. The research made by FOM also shows the 
dependence of the income and the answer: the smaller the income, the less percentage of 
correct answers. Thus, in lots of cases Russian people are too concerned with their 
economic situation and living standards, and the image of the EU among ordinary people 
might be positive, but rather colourless, “interestless”, empty. 
3.4.2 The Desired Image and Reality 
Analyses of the desired image was studied through examining speeches of EU 
representatives and statements of Russian officials, as well as the Russian officials 
attitudes were analysed for depicting the image of the EU in reality. Thus the following 
findings were made. 
First of all, the EU officials try hard make the EU seem independent, try to 
escape any ‘dependence bondage’: 
I do not think the relationship is one of dependence either on the Russian side or on the 
European side. It is a recognition of a very strong set of mutual interests today. If there are 
issues that may arise from time to time between us, we can discuss and resolve those. 
Blair, 2005 
                                                 
33 Besides, according to the results of the Survey, 41% of respondents think that European values have a 
positive influence on the Russian society. 
34 Out of the respondents with higher education, the correct answer is given only by 71% which is not a lot 
for educated people. 
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Both sides agree that mutual interests are at stake, but then Putin comes in and 
stresses again, how much is the EU dependant on Russian oil and gas; and very rarely is 
stated by Mr. Putin, that Russia is also dependent. At the same time, it is important to 
notice, that the diplomatic language as such does not really include the term 
“dependence”, it is usually masked under terms such as “special relationship” or “special 
co-operation”. In the EU–Russia relations the language is changing: lately even the EU 
officials, though unwillingly and very rarely, are starting to use the term of “positive 
interdependence” as the notion “dependence’ itself is understood rather negative and 
does not reflect a healthy, equal relationship: 
[Our] energy partnership is based on strong positive interdependence and we are ready to 
develop these relations for the good of both parties. 
Vanhanen, 2006 
The second finding turned out to be rather controversial. The speeches of the EU 
officials distinguished from, for instance, Russian officials’ in the way that they were less 
open, more formal, polite. The speeches turned out to be hard to analyse, as they were 
impersonalized and emotionless, covered with a delicacy and political correctness. The 
signals, if there were any, were hidden beside the diplomatic shield, creating an image of 
diplomatic and not too harsh actor. When Vladimir Putin would be asked a question on 
democracy, besides just stating that Russia is democratic, he would start rather 
undiplomatic attack on the other democracies, thus trying to defend himself. Nothing like 
that would ever do any of the EU officials. The image of diplomatic coldness and 
accuracy does not allow the EU officials to respond in a firm, strong voice. Thus, in the 
eyes of Russia the EU is created as a delicate and even timid actor, not weak due to all 
the economic strength, but not politically forceful either. Probably, the EU did not want 
to get this result, but rather wanted to be seen as a fair, constructive and reliable partner, 
who is ready for compromise. Meanwhile, Russia still is experiencing difficulties in 
talking to Europe, as it does not always speak with one voice, and the Russian President 
says: “We will wait” (Putin, 2006c). 
*** 
To make the interim conclusions, it is easy to notice that there are certain 
contradictions within the images of Russia and the EU. The image of Russia the way it is 
perceived in the eyes of Europeans contradicts radically with the desired image. Whereas 
the EU suffers from the lack of the desired image as such, thus making the image 
perceived by Russians depict EU as diplomatically weak and indecisive, which is 
definitely not the plan. Turning back to the study of Robert Jervis, we can say that in this 
case probably history matters a lot. First of all, historically the construction of the 
‘Other’ created the somewhat distance between the two actors. Second, the history of 
relations between the EU and the new modern Russia are rather young – only about 16 
years, thus the signals and indices are still not understood completely, or in case of the 
EU are not decided on. Probably the process of learning and adjustment between the EU 
and Russia is still on the way, but until today the images have huge contradictions which 
imbalance perceptions of each other and relations in general. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis concentrated on the asymmetry of the EU–Russia relations and an attempt 
was made to find the reasons of it. Thus, the relations were examined within three 
streams. Firstly, the interdependence link between the EU and Russia was analysed 
through application of the theory of power and interdependence of Joseph Nye and 
Robert Keohane to the case of EU and Russia relations. The analysis showed that both of 
the actors are equally dependent on each other. Thus, the analysis of sensitivity and 
vulnerability, the way they are defined by Nye and Keohane turned out to be essential for 
the application of the interdependence concept. It was found that the vulnerability of the 
EU to any change is somewhat smaller than the vulnerability of Russia. But nevertheless, 
the EU seems to not realise it and not use it. The reason for this lies within other spheres 
of relations. 
Thus, polities and images were analysed to figure out these inconsistencies. The 
study of polities was held within the framework of a governance approach, one of the 
main ideas of which is that “polity defines policy and politics”. The analysis showed that 
the EU and Russia do not have any similarities between each other in terms of polities. 
Moreover, the EU as a polity influences the decisions of Russia towards the EU and vice 
versa; but as they have no similarities and are not able to understand and comprehend 
each other (due to cultural characteristics and modernity versus post–modernity concept), 
it creates dual ambiguity of their relations: neither the EU nor Russia can decide on a 
certain strategy towards the other.  
This ambiguity becomes even more vivid after analyzing the images of both 
actors in the relationship, which was based on the study of images of Robert Jervis and 
the concept of “construction the ‘Other’” of Iver Neumann. The inconsistency between 
the ‘desired image’ of Russia and the real one creates a problem for the EU of talking to 
Russia: it silently accepts the sent image, but does not believe it; the EU considers it as 
signals, which are not working, while the real image is very different. At the same time, 
due to the ambiguity of the image of Russia, its polity and the EU strategy, the EU is 
unable to send any particular image at all, remaining simply politically correct and 
delicate. This in turn creates an image of the EU as a not–so–forceful actor, and thus 
allows the Russian side be less polite than the EU is and allows Russia to argue that the 
EU is extremely dependent on Russia (and this actually works). 
Thus in general, the conceptualisation of polities and images turn out to be of 
crucial importance in building and understanding the relations, especially between what 
is considered to be the ‘democratic zone of peace’ and its outside. The polities of the EU 
and Russia are fundamentally different, even contrasting, which sets them apart. The 
ambiguity of images is so strong, it creates an ocean between them and does not allow 
them to hear each other correctly. But despite all these differences and ambiguities, 
misperceptions and misunderstandings, they have to talk. The interdependence link ties 
the two actors together and makes it impossible for them to escape each other or convert 
the relationship into unbinding meetings once or twice a year for discussions of the 
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weather and tennis tournaments. That is why, the only dialogue which is 
institutionalized, set and has some kind of strategies is the energy dialogue (as the 
interdependence is within the energy sphere). That is why political and cultural dialogues 
are not possible: the EU and Russia are not interdependent in these spheres, and polities 
and images are so complex and not understood by each of the actors. That is why the 
asymmetry exists and will probably not change until the changes within the dimensions 
of polities and images will happen. As long as the EU does not have a certain image it 
wants to send and Russia stays with the same regime and modern understandings of 
world politics, the asymmetry would probably only deepen. 
Thus, through the practical implications this paper challenged to theorise the EU–
Russia relations within three dimensions: interdependence, polities and images. The 
general pattern of “polities and images matter in world politics” was proven by this 
research. This case is the example of negative/ambiguous links between the polities and 
between the images of two actors, what sets them apart, whereas positive images could 
have driven them closer. In the meantime, the only tie that remains between the two 
actors (Russia and the EU) is economic interdependence, which in turn cannot be seen as 
a “positive development in the relations” in the long run. This all are the effects of 
contiguity: the two actors would even want to escape each other, but they cannot; they 
are interconnected, tied together.  
To conclude, it can be noticed, that probably this study might be applied to other 
cases as well and explain the relations between the EU as a post-modern polity with some 
other modern big states, like China or India. In both of these cases, the polities and 
images differ and have certain misunderstandings, but these relations are not bound with 
the effects of contiguity – interdependence link – and thus are less institutionalized, less 
frequent and more ‘symmetrical’. These two cases could create a contrast for the EU–
Russia relations and a further study for the relations between the post-modern and 
modern polities. However this is the case of a separate research programme. 
 38
Appendix I 
The Form of the Survey “What do you think about 
Russia?” 
The Survey was conducted within the student community in different countries of 
the European Union. It was made by joint effort of two students from Lund University 
(Sweden) Liubov Borisova and from the State University Higher School of Economics 
(Moscow, Russia) Nikolai Kolegov. The results of the survey were used for two thesis 
dissertations written in the abovementioned universities on the topics of “The asymmetry 
of the EU-Russia relations” and “Image and brand of Russia”. The respondents were 
asked to fill in the following form and return it back. Only one answer was possible. 
 
1. Have you ever been to Russia? 
A. Yes, more than once. 
B. Yes, once. 
C. No, but I’m planning/would like to go. 
D. No and I don’t even want to go. 
 
2. What is your personal attitude towards Russia? 
A. Very positive attitude. 
B. Somewhat positive attitude. 
C. Neutral. 
D. Rather negative than positive attitude. 
E. Very negative. 
 
3. In your opinion, what is a general attitude towards Russia in the countries of the 
European Union? 
A. Very positive attitude. 
B. Somewhat positive attitude. 
C. Neutral. 
D. Rather negative than positive attitude. 
E. Very negative. 
 
4. The President of Russian Federation is Vladimir Putin. What is your personal 
attitude towards him? 
A. Positive attitude. 
B. Somewhat positive. 
C. Neutral. 
D. Rather negative than positive. 
E. Negative attitude. 
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F. No definite answer. 
 
5. Would you like Russia to become a part of the European Union one day? 
A. Definitely yes. 
B. May be in some longtime perspective. 
C. I do not know, have never thought about it. 
D. Rather no, than yes. 
E. Definitely no. 
 
6. The International Olympic Committee in July 2007 will make a decision about the 
country and city which will host the Winter Olympic Games 2014. The Russian city of 
Sochi is participating in the bid for Winter Olympics 2014. How well do you know about 
it? 
A. I know a lot about it. I know about the measures which are taken by 
Sochi, about the city itself and its pluses and minuses. 
B. I don’t know a lot, but I have heard some facts. 
C. Well, I have heard something about it. 
D. I don’t know anything, but I would like to find out more. 
E. I don’t know about it and don’t even want to know. 
 
7. What Russian companies and businessmen do you know (have you heard of)? 
Could you please give three examples? 
 
 
 
8. Please, write three notions which are associated for you with nowadays Russia. 
 
 
 
9. What EU country are you citizen of?_________________________________ 
 
10. What is your age?___________ 
 
11. What is your level of education?___________________________________ 
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Appendix II 
Results of the survey “What do you think about 
Russia?” 
Total number of respondents: 321. Age: 15–61. Average age: 24,2. Majority has 
Bachelor degree or in the process of achieving one (80%). Representatives of all 27 EU 
member states. Fieldwork: 23.04–09.05.2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Have you ever been to Russia?
C: 210
66%
D: 45
14%
A: 36
11%
B: 30
9%
A. Yes, more than once.
B. Yes, once.
C. No, but I’m
planning/would like to go.
D. No and I don’t even
want to go.
2. What is your personal attitude towards 
Russia?E: 8
2%
D: 69
21%
C: 111
36%
B: 104
32%
A: 29
9%
A. Very positive attitude.
B. Somewhat positive
attitude.
C. Neutral.
D. Rather negative than
positive attitude.
E. Very negative.
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. In your opinion, what is a general attitude 
towards Russia in the countries of the 
European Union?
D: 195
60%
C: 82
26%
B: 32
10%
E: 12
4%
A: 0%
A. Very positive attitude.
B. Somewhat positive
attitude.
C. Neutral.
D. Rather negative than
positive attitude.
E. Very negative.
4. The President of Russian Federation is 
Vladimir Putin. What is your personal attitude 
towards him?
F: 17
6%
E: 135
48%
D: 59
21%
C: 36
13%
B: 25
9%
A: 7
3%
A. Positive attitude.
B. Somewhat positive.
C. Neutral.
D. Rather negative than
positive.
E. Negative attitude.
F. No definite answer.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Would you like Russia to become a part of 
the European Union one day?
D: 84
26%
E: 62
19%
A: 26
8%
B: 100
32%
C: 49
15%
A. Definitely yes.
B. May be in some
longtime perspective.
C. I do not know, have
never thought about it.
D. Rather no, than yes.
E. Definitely no.
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6. The Russian city of Sochi is participating in the bid for Winter Olympics 
2014. How well do you know about it?
E: 100
31%
A: 21
7% B: 22
7%
C: 36
11%
D: 142
44%
A. I know a lot about it. I know about the measures
which are taken by Sochi, about the city itself and
its pluses and minuses.
B. I don’t know a lot, but I have heard some facts.
C. Well, I have heard something about it.
D. I don’t know anything, but I would like to find out
more.
E. I don’t know about it and don’t even want to
know.
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7.2 Most mentioned Russian companies
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Appendix III 
The Form of the Survey “What do you think about 
European Union?” 
The Survey was conducted within the student community in Russia. It was conducted by 
the student from Lund University (Sweden) Liubov Borisova. The results of the survey 
were used for the thesis dissertations written in Lund University on the topic of “The 
asymmetry of the EU-Russia relations”. The respondents were asked to fill in the 
following form and send it back. Only one answer was possible. 
 
 
Your age: _____________________ Your education: ______________________ 
 
1. Have you ever been to the countries of the EU? 
A. Yes, in many of them 
B. Yes, in one/several 
C. Have never been to any, but would like/planning to go 
D. Have never been to any and do not want to go 
 
2. Do you perceive EU as a united polity? 
A. The EU is a real united polity  
B. No, EU is only an economic union  
C. No, EU is only a political union 
D. EU is not really a union at all ЕС, far from being a united entity 
E. I do not know, have never thought about it 
 
3. What is your personal attitude towards the EU? 
A. Positive attitude. 
B. Somewhat positive attitude. 
C. Neutral. 
D. Rather negative than positive attitude. 
E. Negative. 
 
4. Do you think the EU plays an important role in world politics?  
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. Only some separate countries. – Which ones? ______________________ 
D. I do not know, have never thought about it 
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 5. Do you consider the EU a threat for Russia?  
A. Yes 
B. No 
C. Only some separate countries. – Which ones? ______________________ 
D. I do not know, have never thought about it 
 
6. What influence do the EU values have on the Russian society? 
A. Positive 
B. Negative 
C. We have the same values 
D. Europe has lost its values 
E. I don’t know/ does not have any influence. 
 
7. What European companies and businessmen do you know (have you heard of)? 
Could you please give three examples? 
 
 
 
8. Please, write three notions which are associated for you with the European Union. 
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Appendix IV 
Results of the survey “What do you think of the 
European Union?”  
Held among Russian citizens. Total number of respondents: 208. Representatives of 17 
Russian regions. Age range: 16–57. Average age: 23,6. Majority has Higher education 
ore are in the process of achieving one (85%). Fieldwork: 23.04–09.05.2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Have you ever been to the countries of the EU?
D: 7
3%
C: 80
38%
B: 85
42%
A: 36
17%
A. Yes, in many of them
B. Yes, in one/several
C. Have never been to any,
but w ould like/planning to
go
D. Have never been to any
and do not w ant to go
2. Do you perceive EU as a united polity?
D: 30
15%
C: 31
15%
B: 106
51%
A: 16
8%
E: 22
11%
A. The EU is a real united
polity 
B. No, EU is only an
economic union 
C. No, EU is only a political
union
D. EU is not really a union at
all ЕС, far from being a
united entity
E. I do not know , have never
thought about it
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What is your personal attitude towards the EU?
C: 88
42%
A: 39
19%
B: 66
32%
E: 3
1%
D: 12
6%
A. Positive attitude.
B. Somew hat positive
attitude.
C. Neutral.
D. Rather negative than
positive attitude.
E. Negative.
4. Do you think the EU plays an important role 
in world politics?
C: 19
9%
B: 42
20%
A: 116
56%
D: 31
15% A. Yes
B. No
C. Only some separate
countries. – Which ones?
D. I do not know , have
never thought about it
6. What influence do the EU values have on the 
Russian society?
E: 40
19%
D: 44
21%
C: 12
6%
B: 26
13%
A: 86
41%
A.     Positive
B.     Negative
C.     We have the same
values
D.     Europe has lost its
values
E.      I don’t know / does
not have any influence.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5. Do you consider the EU a threat for Russia?
D: 10
5%C: 27
13%
B: 143
69%
A: 28
13% A. Yes
B. No
C. Only some separate
countries. – Which ones?
D. I do not know , have
never thought about it
 
 45
7. What European businessmen and companies do you know? 
It is impossible to make statistics in this question. First of all, very few people 
named any businessmen at all. Such names could be found: Silvio Berlusconi, lord John 
Brown, Daniel Vasella, Nathaniel Rothschild, Bill Gates, out of which Berlusconi is the 
most popular (about 2,5% of mentioning) 
Second, there are a lot of companies mentioned, but neither of them has got 10% 
or more of mentioning. The following companies are mentioned: Volkswagen, BMW, 
Ikea, Siemens, Philips, Lancome, Opel, Electrolux, TetraPak, Renault, Ford, 
Schwarzkopf, Samsung, Oriflame, Audi, Bosch, Alcatel, Air France, British Petroleum, 
Peugeot, Mercedes, Porsche, L’Oreal, Max Factor, Vichy, Adidas, Danone, Shell, Nokia 
(9%), Unilever, Volvo, SAAB, Lloyd, Nike, Deloitte and Touche, Vodafone, Nestle, 
Ferrari, Raiffeisen Group, Braun, McDonalds, Levi’s, Ernst and Young, PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers, Fiat, Versace, Rolandberger, Guinness, Rolex, British Airways, Daimler-Benz, 
Tuborg, Skoda, Societe Generale, Ariston, Swatch, Lufthansa, Gucci, DHL, Dolce & 
Gabana, Easy Jet, Microsoft, Coca-cola, Prada, Oggi, Aerobus, Citroen, Gas de France.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8. Notions which are associated with the European Union
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Appendix V 
In the process of analysis of images the following speeches/conferences (both 
texts and video recordings) were under attention: 
 
1. Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 2005. The European Neighbourhood Policy: helping 
ourselves through helping our neighbours. Speech. Conference of Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chairmen of EU member and candidate states. London, October 31, 2005. 
2. Ferrero-Waldner, Benita, 2006. The European Neighbourhood Policy: bringing our 
neighbours close. Speech. Giving the Neighbours a stake in the EU internal market, 10th 
Euro-Mediterranean Economic Transition Conference. Brussels, June 6, 2006. 
3. Joint Press Conference of Vladimir Putin, British Prime Minister Anthony Blair, 
President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso and European Union High 
representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana Following the 
Russian-EU Summit in London, October 4, 2005. 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/10/04/2211_type82914type82915_94933.shtm 
4. Joint Press Conference of Vladimir Putin, Finnish Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen 
and President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso after the Informal 
Meeting in Lahti, Finland. October 20, 2006. 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/10/20/1739_type82914type82915_112793.sht
ml 
5. Joint Press Conference of Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister of Finland Matti 
Vanhanen, President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, Secretary 
General of the EU Council and EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy Javier Solana, Prime Minister of Norway Jens Stoltenberg and Prime 
Minister of Iceland Geir Haarde following the Russia-EU summit meeting in Helsinki, 
November 24, 2006. 
http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2006/11/24/1958_type63377type63380type82634_11444
7.shtml 
6. Press Conference on the Results of Russian-American Talks. US – Russia 
Bratislava Summit. February 24, 2005. 
http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2005/02/24/2357_type63377type63380type82634_84527.
shtml 
7. Press Statements and Answers to Journalists’ Questions Following Russian-Italian 
Intergovernmental Consultations. Bari. March 14, 2007. 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/03/14/2049_type82914type82915_119984.sht
ml 
8. Press Statements and Answers to Questions Following Russian-Czech Talks. 
Moscow. April 28, 2007. 
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http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/04/28/1208_type82914type82915_125947.sht
ml 
9. Prodi, Romano, 2002. A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability. 
Speech. “Peace, Security And Stability – International Dialogue and the Role of the EU” 
Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project. Brussels, December 5–6, 2002. 
10. Putin, Vladimir, 2000. Annual Federal Assembly speech. July 8, 2000. Moscow, 
Kremlin. 
http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2000/07/08/0000_type63372type63374_28782.shtml 
11. Putin, Vladimir, 2001. Annual Federal Assembly speech. April 3, 2001. Moscow, 
Kremlin. 
http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2001/04/03/0000_type63372type63374_28514.shtml 
12. Putin, Vladimir, 2004. Speech at the enlarged session of the Government with the 
participations of the heads of the administrative divisions of the Russian Federation. 
September 13, 2004. Moscow. 
http://president.kremlin.ru/appears/2004/09/13/1514_type63374type6337 
8type82634_76651.shtml 
13. Putin, Vladimir, 2006a. Interview with ZDF Television Channel (Germany). 
http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2006/07/13/0852_type63379_108559.shtml 
14. Putin, Vladimir, 2006b. Interview for the newspaper “Russian thought” (“Russkaya 
Mysl”). 23.11.2006. 
http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2006/11/23/0742_type63379_114330.shtml 
15. Record of the content of the Russia–EU Summit in Saint Petersbourg, May 31, 
2003. http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2003/05/31/1430_type63377_47580.shtml 
 
The selection was made by date, by importance: thus the latest speeches were 
chosen and the press conferences of latest EU–Russia Summits. 
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